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Highlights The August 1 deadline for Congress to raise the debt ceiling will come and go but the looming debt showdown will not replay the 2011-13 crisis. It is not a major risk to the bull market.  The Biden administration still has the political capital to pass a signature piece of legislation via budget reconciliation by end of year.  The tax component of the plan may bring a negative surprise but the market is likely to be more concerned over inflation expectations, eventual Fed rate hikes, and the 2022 fiscal cliff.  The Delta variant of COVID-19 is spreading rapidly in Republican-leaning states but the existence of effective vaccines presents an immediate solution. Any substantial new jitters over the pandemic will increase monetary and fiscal stimulus.  Stay long value over growth stocks despite near term risks and setbacks. Reassess if technical support is broken. Feature The Democratic Party is attempting to achieve two major things before Congress goes on recess in early August. The first is a $1.2 trillion bipartisan infrastructure package – which will take longer than that and may never pass. The second is a $2-$6 trillion budget resolution that will contain reconciliation instructions to enable the Senate to pass President Joe Biden’s proposed $2.5-$4.1 trillion American Jobs and Families Plan with 51 votes. Democrats may very well achieve this resolution before going on recess but that is the very problem when it comes to negotiations with Republicans. Even though divisions within Republican ranks make bipartisanship more likely to succeed than usual, investors should not bet on it. A partisan reconciliation process virtually guarantees both that Democrats pass their next spending bill without major disappointments for the market and that the debt ceiling is not a substantial risk to the bull market. The real risk for investors is that the markets have mostly priced the Democrats’ stimulus spending and will increasingly turn to tax hikes and especially Fed rate hikes. While we expect dovish surprises from the Fed, the strong 4.5% year-on-year growth in core consumer prices, in the context of booming consumer sentiment (Chart 1), suggests the opposite. Chart 1Consumer Confidence Still Rebounding The Debt Ceiling Is Not A Significant Risk To The Bull Market Investors are increasingly concerned about the US debt ceiling, or statutory limit on the national debt, which comes due on August 1. But the debt ceiling does not pose a significant risk to the bull market this time around. The US is not in the same political context as it was in 2011-13 when debt showdowns roiled markets. Investors’ concerns are understandable, of course. In the wake of the Great Recession, congressional Democrats and Republicans quarreled over the debt ceiling, resulting in notable disinflationary episodes in which stocks fell while Treasuries and the dollar rallied (Chart 2). A close look at the debt showdowns of summer 2011 and winter 2012-13 reveals that the “risk off” phase occurred immediately in the first case and over the succeeding month in the second case (Chart 3). The implication is that the whole period from September to December of 2021 could be at risk from any new debt showdown. To understand why risk is not substantial this year one needs to understand what the debt ceiling is. Chart 2ABiden Will Fare Better Than Obama On Debt Ceiling Chart 2BBiden Will Fare Better Than Obama On Debt Ceiling Chart 3A Close Look At Debt Ceiling Showdowns, 2011-13 The debt ceiling is a legislative instrument intended to constrain the US’s public debt. Congress must authorize a higher debt limit to enable the Treasury Department to make debt payments. Legislating a higher debt ceiling is not the same as legislating government spending. Congress spends money through the annual appropriations process. Government spending amidst recurring budget deficits requires new debt issuance to provide the funds to be spent. But debt in excess of the statutory limit must be authorized by raising the limit. The last time Congress expanded the debt ceiling was in August 2019, leaving August 1, 2021 as the next deadline. Theoretically it is unpopular for congressmen to increase the allowance for their own profligate policies and as such the debt ceiling acts a curb on deficits and debt. In reality the two political parties usually pull together the 60 votes needed in the Senate to raise or suspend the limit and prevent the federal government from defaulting on debt payments that come due. The reason is that, if the debt limit were not raised, the government would default on debt payments and be forced to halt social security payments, civil servant wages, and other essential payments. A failure to write checks to seniors and military veterans would be extremely unpopular and both the president’s party and the opposition party would suffer for it (Chart 4). Chart 4ABoth President And Congress To Suffer From Any Debt Showdown Chart 4BBoth President And Congress To Suffer From Any Debt Showdown This does not mean that 10 Senate Republicans can easily be found to join 50 Democrats, thus reaching 60 votes in the Senate to raise the debt limit. The battle is likely to extend well into the fall, pushing up against Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s warning that the Treasury could run out of funds before Congress returns in mid-September. The battle will likely extend into October and create fears of a default.  Getting 10 Republicans is difficult. It will not occur as part of a compromise infrastructure package, even though this package already has 11 Republicans supporting it. First, the bipartisan infrastructure deal may fail anyway because Republicans know that Democratic leadership, whether they admit it or not, will tie the deal to the passage of their larger budget reconciliation bill later this fall. Since Republicans oppose the reconciliation bill they may not be able to save face if they vote for an infrastructure deal that enables it. And Democrats do not have any reason to compromise on a bipartisan deal if they think it will destroy their larger reconciliation ambitions. Second, if a bipartisan infrastructure deal comes together, Republicans will insist that the debt ceiling is kept separate. They will not want to link themselves and their infrastructure spending with the bulging national debt. Rather they will want to force the Democrats to link their massive social spending with the national debt. Democrats may accept this trade off since the Biden administration wants a bipartisan deal – as long as they are given guarantees from moderate Senate Democrats that the latter  will support the reconciliation bill. Public opinion is not generally distressed when it comes to federal budget deficits and the national debt. Only 3% of Americans cite these as the most important problem facing the country today – obviously people are more concerned with the general economic recovery and unemployment (Chart 5). However, voters clearly believe debt is one of the country’s problems, with 43% saying they are “very concerned” about debt growth, including 45% of independents. Republicans are under significant pressure on these issues, which is why only moderates would conceivably vote to raise the debt limit and even then would only raise it if forced to choose between doing so and triggering a national default (Chart 6). Brinkmanship is to be expected. Chart 5Voters Say Recovery More Important Than Debt Chart 6Yet Concern About Debt Is Not Negligible While public opinion generally favors infrastructure spending, support for infrastructure falls when it is explicitly linked to increases in national debt. Only 39% of voters, and 30% of independents, think it is acceptable to increase the debt to pay for infrastructure, according to a recent Ipsos/Reuters poll (Chart 7). About 60% of Democrats agree with this statement and 22% of Republicans. The implication – as we have long argued – is that investors should not bet on a bipartisan deal. They should bet on the partisan reconciliation process. Chart 7Democrats Support More Debt For Infrastructure … Others Do Not Support for extreme deficit spending is likely to wane as the economy recovers and the sense of crisis abates. Support for emergency COVID-19 fiscal relief was very high early this year (Chart 8). Yet even at the height of the lockdowns there was a non-negligible group of voters who claimed to care about deficits (Chart 9). Fortunately for the Biden administration, the window of opportunity has not yet closed. The rise in the Delta variant of COVID-19 is generating higher hospitalization rates and renewed concerns about the pandemic, which will help support additional stimulus measures (Table 1). There is still time to pass a major spending bill on infrastructure and/or social welfare before the end of the year. Chart 8Support For COVID Relief Was Very High Chart 9Yet Voters Showed Some Concern About Deficits Even At Height Of Crisis Table 12022 Swing States Struggling With COVID-19 Ultimately Democrats control both chambers of Congress and will be able to vote with party discipline on raising the debt ceiling. They can raise the debt ceiling with a simple majority vote if they include it in their upcoming budget reconciliation bill. This is the main reason why investors should look through any financial market jitters: there is a clear escape hatch if Republicans obstruct. The only reason we do not exclude the possibility of Republican cooperation entirely is that Republicans are in such desperate need of a lifeline following President Trump’s defeat and the post-election riot on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the last time Republicans saw anywhere near such low levels of partisan identification was in 2013, after House Republicans brought the US to the brink of defaulting on its debt (Chart 10). The Senate Republicans are divided, not unified in willingness to trigger a default, and we can count at least 10 Senate Republicans who will capitulate if necessary to prevent a default. Chart 10Republicans Need A Lifeline … Infrastructure May Be It Of course, Senate Republicans could refuse to raise the debt ceiling anyway. But the crucial difference is that Congress is not gridlocked. Democrats, as the ruling party, would suffer in the event of a default and they have the reconciliation process to prevent that from happening. (We have also maintained that they will eventually water down or abolish the Senate filibuster, which would open another way to lift the debt ceiling, although so far they have not succeeded in doing so.) Bottom Line: There are reasons for investors to be increasingly risk averse – tax hikes, eventual Fed rate hikes, the 2022 fiscal cliff, global growth sputters – but the debt ceiling is not one of them. Any major stock market jitters that emerge because of the debt ceiling should be ignored if they are not attended by more significant risks. Biden’s Political Capital Still Sufficient For One More Big Bill All year we have maintained that President Biden will get at least one signature bill passed in addition to the huge COVID-19 relief bill, the American Rescue Plan, passed at the beginning of the year. This view is based in our reading of his political support and capability, as evinced in our Political Capital Index, which we update weekly in the Appendix. This view is on track and we maintain high conviction. Nevertheless readers should be aware that Biden’s support will wobble over the coming months and US economic policy uncertainty will rebound from post-pandemic lows. This week’s update of the Political Capital Index shows some chinks in Biden’s armor that will likely get wider over the coming months, though we do not expect them to prevent the bill from passing. First, while political polarization has subsided from recent peaks in 2020, our polarization indicators are starting to rebound from post-election lows. Our polarization proxy (the gap in partisan approval of the president) will eventually find a floor considering the historically high structural polarization in the country. Meanwhile economic sentiment polarization and the Philly Fed Partisan Conflict Index climbed from their respective lows in the first half of the year, as Congress bickered over Biden’s next reconciliation bill (Chart 11). The upcoming partisan battles over infrastructure, the debt ceiling, budget appropriations, voting rights, guns, the Hyde amendment (abortion), a possible government shutdown, and the midterm elections will revive polarization even if it does not surpass 2020 peaks. Partisanship will ensure the passage of a reconciliation bill but then it will reduce Biden’s ability to pass legislation afterwards.    Chart 11Polarization Still Historically Elevated Second, Biden’s approval rating is rebounding a bit in July from its low point in June but the legislative process – as well as looming foreign policy challenges and other negative surprises – will weigh on his approval, at least until his infrastructure bill passes (Chart 12). Over the medium term, strong consumer sentiment and a recovering economy will prevent Biden’s approval rating from falling to President Trump’s levels, at least until a major mistake or negative shock occurs. Nevertheless presidents tend to have low approval ratings in the modern era due to partisanship and so far Biden is no exception. Chart 12ABiden Approval Will Suffer Till Infrastructure Passes Chart 12BBiden Approval Will Suffer Till Infrastructure Passes Third, while small business continues to be more concerned with wages and inflation than with Biden’s legislative agenda, concerns about higher taxes are gradually emerging. The business community may finally be internalizing Biden’s American Jobs Plan, which will include a corporate tax hike and possibly also individual tax hikes (Chart 13). The stock market is unlikely to ignore Biden’s corporate tax hikes forever, even if they only cause a one-off hit to earnings of 8%-10%. We expect negative tax surprises from the reconciliation process. The small business community’s opposition to Biden’s agenda is well known, and limited in impact, but it will increasingly detract from his political capital on the margin. Fourth, the economy is beginning to decelerate albeit from a very high rate of growth. The manufacturing PMI and its employment component have fallen from their highs in the first half of the year while the ratio of new orders to inventories was flat in June. The non-manufacturing sector showed the same trend with non-manufacturing business activity and new orders-to-inventories coming down from earlier heights. Non-manufacturing employment ticked down though it will likely rebound soon as enhanced federal unemployment benefits expire (Chart 14). Capex intentions softened a bit. Chart 13Small Biz Wakes Up To Inflation, Tax Hikes Chart 14Economy To Decelerate From Highs Still, the unemployment rate continued its decline in June and household and business balance sheets are strong as the economic recovery continues. Biden’s ability to pass his spending plans will ensure that the government contribution to growth remains robust in the coming years, after a soft patch in 2022 as the infrastructure plan is gradually rolled out. Most of these indicators show improvement relative to November, which gives Biden a store of political capital.  Bottom Line: Polarization and policy uncertainty are likely to rebound as the economy decelerates, albeit from rapid growth. Ultimately Biden is likely to pass a signature government spending plan by the end of the year, which will give his approval rating a boost. But given thin margins in Congress, and the looming 2022 midterm elections, Biden’s political capital will largely be exhausted after the second half of this year. Fiscal policy will likely be frozen in place for several years after that. Investment Takeaways The debt ceiling is not a major risk to the bull market, though congressional brinkmanship is inevitable. We are prepared for more volatility and near-term equity setbacks but jitters arising solely from the debt ceiling should be looked through.. Investors should stay focused on the high likelihood that Biden and the Democrats will pass a reconciliation bill that will add about $1.3-$2.5 trillion to the budget deficit over eight years. Disappointments in the bill (higher taxes, lower spending) pose a greater risk to the stock market than the debt ceiling. This bill will solidify the economic recovery but also exact a one-off toll on corporate earnings and hasten concerns over rising inflation expectations and Fed rate hikes. Furthermore a fiscal cliff looms in 2022 as budget deficits normalize from extreme levels. Until new stimulus is secured, this fiscal cliff poses a much greater risk than debt ceilings or a possible government shutdown. The Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus is threatening to clog hospitals and thus poses a risk of forcing authorities to tighten social restrictions, especially in Republican-leaning states where vaccination rates are lower (Chart 15). However, we expect vaccinations to rise – and meanwhile highly vaccinated areas will remain free to conduct business. As long as vaccines remain effective, any scare over variants of the virus will be limited. A selloff is possible but would trigger new bouts of monetary and fiscal stimulus. Chart 15Red States Will Have To Increase Vaccination We will maintain our cyclical orientation of favoring value stocks over growth stocks, although this trade faces an immediate and critical test that could trigger a revaluation (Chart 16). Tactically it should be clear from this report that rising policy uncertainty and other near-term risks are abounding. Chart 16A Test For Value Versus Growth   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table A1USPS Trade Table Table A2Political Risk Matrix Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A3Political Capital Index Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes  
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According to BCA Research’s US Political Strategy service, the August 1 deadline for Congress to raise the debt ceiling is not a major risk to the bull market. Investors are increasingly concerned about the US debt ceiling, or statutory limit on the national…
June’s US consumer price index, which was released on Tuesday, surprised on the upside. However, there is one cooling effect on the horizon that the sizzling hot US inflation should take note of: a slowing China. Chinese PPI – which tends to lead US core CPI…
The UK’s various inflation indicators surprised to the upside in June. Headline CPI inflation rose to a 3-year high of 2.5% from 2.1%, above the anticipated 0.1pp increase. Similarly, at 2.3% y/y, core CPI inflation exceeded market expectations that it would…
Highlights It is too early to conclude that the PBoC’s surprise rate cut last Friday to its reserve requirement ratio (RRR) marks the beginning of another policy easing cycle.  Historically it took more than a single RRR reduction to lower interest rates and to boost credit growth. Overall economic conditions do not yet suggest that Chinese policymakers will initiate a broad-based policy easing to spur demand. The end-of-July Politburo meeting will shed more light on whether there is a decisive turn in China’s overall policy stance. In previous cycles, consecutive RRR cuts led to bond market rallies, but were not good leading indicators for equities, which have been more closely correlated with cyclical swings in credit and business cycle. We recommend patience. Chinese onshore stocks are richly valued and their prices can still correct in Q3 when corporate profits and economic growth slow further. Feature The speed and magnitude of the PBoC’s 50-basis point trim in its RRR rate last week exceeded market expectations. The RRR rate drop, combined with June’s better-than-expected credit data, sparked speculation that China’s macroeconomic policy had shifted to an easier mode. A single RRR cut does not indicate that another policy easing cycle is underway. Rather, the PBoC’s intention is to prevent rising demand for liquidity in 2H21 from significantly pushing up interest rates. In addition, we do not expect that the credit impulse will decisively turn around until later this year. We will remain alert to any signs of additional policy easing, particularly because policymakers will face more pressure to maintain trend growth next year. The July Politburo meeting may provide more information on the direction of Chinese macro policy going forward. Meanwhile, investors should stay the course. In previous cycles there were long lags between the first RRR cut and sustained rallies in China’s onshore stock markets. We will continue to maintain an underweight stance towards Chinese stocks through the next three months, given that economic data and corporate profits will likely weaken further in Q3. Surprise, Surprise! The PBoC lowered the RRR rate only two days after the State Council mentioned the possibility, which exceeded the consensus. Historically, the PBoC has always made more than one RRR reduction during easing cycles, separated by about three months. Are more RRR cuts pending and does the initial decrease mark the beginning of another policy easing cycle? It is too early to conclude that a broad-based easing cycle has started, for the following reasons: First, economic fundamentals do not suggest an urgent need for policy easing. The economy is softening, but it is softening from a very elevated level (Chart 1). Importantly, production is weakening at a faster pace than demand and partially due to COVID-related idiosyncrasies. This supply-side issue cannot be solved by monetary easing.  For example, the production subcomponent of the manufacturing PMI fell in June while new orders increased (Chart 2). Since its trough in April last year, the gap between new orders and production has consistently narrowed for 11 of the past 15 months, highlighting that the demand-side recovery has been outpacing the supply-side. The recent resurgence in COVID-19 cases and local lockdowns in Guangdong province, which is China’s manufacturing and export powerhouse, may have curbed June’s manufacturing production and new export orders. Global supply shortages in raw materials and chips also add to the sluggishness in manufacturing production. Chart 1Chinese Economy Is Slowing, But Not Too Slow Chart 2Demand Not As Soft Compared With Production Similarly, China’s service PMI slipped notably in June and has closely tracked the country’s domestic COVID-19 situation. The decline is an issue that policy easing and boosting demand will not solve (Chart 3). Secondly, global supply chains are still impaired and commodity prices remain elevated. Even though China’s PPI on a year-over-year basis rolled over in June, it is at its highest level since 2008 (Chart 4). As such, spurring demand through monetary easing would only exacerbate inflationary pressures among producers. Chart 3Slow Recovery In Services Largely Due To Lingering COVID Effects Chart 4Producer Prices Remain Elevated Apart from COVID-related disruptions, the weakness in China’s economy this year has been driven by slower growth in infrastructure and real estate investment due to tightened regulatory oversights that were put in place late last year (Chart 5). Construction PMI declined sharply from its peak in March and both excavator sales and loader sales have plummeted since Q1 this year (Chart 5, bottom panel). However, regulatory tightening towards the housing market and infrastructure projects remain firmly in place, suggesting that policymakers are not looking to stimulate the old economy sectors to support growth. Lastly, despite weaker home sales, housing prices in tier-one cities continue to escalate (Chart 6). The rising prices will keep authorities vigilant about excessive liquidity in the market.    Chart 5It Has Been Chinese Policymakers' Intention To Slow The 'Old Economy' Sectors Chart 6Housing Market Mania Remains Authorities' Pressure Point Bottom Line: Supply-demand dynamics in the global economy and China’s domestic inflationary pressures suggest that it is premature to assume that the RRR cut marks the beginning of another policy easing cycle.  Why Now? Chart 7More 'Pain' Needed For Broad Easing The drop in the RRR highlights the PBoC’s determination to maintain a low interest-rate environment without any further easing, and does not indicate that the central bank has shifted its current policy setting framework. The PBoC has been reactive rather than proactive in the past as it typically waits for severe signs of economic weakness before broadly relaxing its policy (Chart 7). The PBoC cited two main reasons for the RRR cut. One is to ease liquidity pressures of small to medium enterprises (SMEs), which have been struggling with rising input prices and subdued output prices (Chart 8). This motive is consistent with the PBoC’s monetary position so far this year –the central bank has kept rates at historical low levels while scaling back credit creation (Chart 9).   Chart 8SMEs Under Elevated Pricing Stress Chart 9The PBoC Has Kept Rates At Historic Low Levels Demand for liquidity will rise meaningfully in the second half of the year due to an acceleration in local government bond issuance and the large number of expiring medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans and bonds. The liquidity gap could significantly push up interbank and market-based interest rates without the central bank’s intervention. The amount of maturing MLF and government bonds could be more than RMB1 trillion in July. Thus, the 50bp RRR cut, which the PBoC indicates will free up about RMB1 trillion of liquidity to the banking system, will ensure that interest rates remain stable. Chart 10Bank Lending Rates Have Not Declined With Policy Rates The PBoC also stated that it intends to keep down financing costs for both banks and SMEs. The statement is vague, but the PBoC may mean it plans to guide bank lending rates lower for SMEs and, at the same time, provide banks (particularly smaller banks) with enough liquidity to encourage lending to those enterprises. To achieve this goal, a broad-based RRR cut would be more effective than other monetary policy tools, such as open-market operations or MLF injections, which normally benefit large commercial banks more than their smaller counterparts. While interbank rates have been sliding since Q4 last year, the weighted average lending rates moved sideways and even ticked up slightly this year (Chart 10). As of Q1 2021, more than half of bank loans charged higher interest rates than the loan prime rate (LPR), highlighting a distribution matrix unfavorable to SMEs (Chart 11). Loan demand from SMEs, as shown in the PBoC survey, peaked much earlier and tumbled more rapidly than their large peers (Chart 12). Chart 11SMEs Face Rising Input And Funding Costs Chart 12Waning SMEs' Demand For Bank Credit Lowering lending rates for SMEs is usually at the cost of the banks by bearing higher default risks and lower profits. A RRR reduction, coupled with recent changes in banks’ deposit rate pricing mechanisms,1 are measures that can potentially reduce the banks’ liability costs. Bottom Line: The PBoC is using a RRR cut to avoid a sudden jump in interest rates from their low levels in 1H21, and to reduce funding costs for the SMEs and banks. What About Credit Growth? Chart 13Credit Numbers In June Beat Market Expectations Credit numbers beat the market’s expectations in June. Both credit growth and impulse rose slightly after a fast deceleration in much of 1H21 (Chart 13). We continue to expect the credit impulse to hover at a low level throughout Q3. Local government bond issuance will pick up in 2H21, but the acceleration will not necessarily lead to a reversal in credit growth (Chart 14). On a year-over-year basis, high base during Q3 last year will depress credit growth and impulse in the next three months. Moreover, in the past couple years, on average local government bonds account for only about 18% of annual total social financing. As such, the pace of bank loan expansion would need to substantially accelerate to reverse the slowdown in credit growth in the next three months. In previous cycles, on average it took more than one RRR cut and about two quarters for credit growth to turn around (Chart 15). Therefore, even if monetary policy is on an easing path, we expect credit growth to pick up in Q4 at the earliest. Chart 14LG Bonds Only A Small Part Of Total Credit Creation Chart 15Credit Growth Lags RRR Cuts By About Two Quarters Furthermore, policymakers are unlikely to deviate from targeting credit growth in line with nominal GDP this year. Based on our estimate, the target suggests that the overall credit impulse relative to 2020 will be negative this year (Chart 16). Chart 16Negative Credit Impulse In 2021 Relative To 2020 Chart 17The Credit Structure, Rather Than Volume, Will Improve In 2H21   Meanwhile, we think that the PBoC will focus on improving the structure of credit creation by continuing to encourage medium- to long-term lending, while scaling back shadow banking and short-term loans (Chart 17). Corporate bond financing improved slightly in June. However, room for further improvement in corporate bond issuance is small this year, given tightened financing reglations on local government financing vehicles. Downside potential for corporate bond yields is also limited in 2H21, when the economy slows and corporate bond default risks are rising (Chart 18).  Given elevated housing prices and tightened regulations to contain the property sector’s leverage, bank lending to real estate developers and mortgages will continue to trend down in the foreseeable future, regardless the direction of interest rates (Chart 19). Chart 18Limited Upsides For Corporate Bond Issuance In 2H21 Chart 19Bank Loans To Property Market Unlikely To Pick Up In 2H21 Bottom Line: Regardless changes in monetary policy, credit growth will not decisively bottom until later this year. Investment Implications Chart 20Chinese Stock Prices Failed To Break Out Chinese stocks in both onshore and offshore equity markets failed to reverse their trend of underperformance relative to global stocks (Chart 20). Investors should be patient in upgrading their allocation to Chinese stocks from underweight to overweight, in both absolute terms and within a global equity portfolio.  Historically, there has been a long lag between an initial RRR trim and a trough in Chinese onshore stock prices (Chart 21). Although prices moved up along with RRR cut announcements in the past, the price upticks were short lived. Stock prices in previous cycles troughed when the credit impulse and/or the economy bottomed. Given our view that a single RRR decrease does not indicate a broad-based policy easing and the credit impulse is unlikely to pick up until later this year, investors should wait for more price setbacks in Q3 before favoring Chinese stocks again.  Chart 21Long Lags Between First RRR Cut And Stock Market Troughs We are slightly more optimistic than last month about Chinese bonds because the RRR cut has reduced the possibility for any substantial rise in interest rates in 2H21. However, we maintain a cautious view on Chinese government and corporate bonds in Q3. In previous cycles, onshore bond yields often fluctuated sideways or even climbed a bit following the first RRR reduction. It often took several RRR drops, more policy easing signals and sure signs of economic weakening for the bond market to enter a tradable bull run (Chart 22). Therefore, we recommend investors stay on the sidelines for a better entry price point. Chart 22It Takes More Than One RRR Cut To Start A Bond Market Bull Run It is also unrealistic to expect the RRR cut will lead to significant and sustained devaluation in the RMB relative to the US dollar. We expect the dollar index to rebound somewhat in Q3 on the back of positive US employment data surprises which will push US bond yields higher. However, following previous RRR cuts, the RMB had sizeable depreciations only when geopolitical events (the US-China trade war in 2018/19) or drastic central bank intervention (the August 2015 de-pegging from the USD) coincided with the RRR cuts. These scenarios are not likely to play out in the next six months (Chart 23). As such, we maintain our view that the CNY will slightly weaken against the USD in Q3 but will end the year at around 6.4. Chart 23Expect Muted And Short-Lived Movements In The USDCNY From A Single RRR Cut   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1The reform changes the way banks calculate and offer deposit rates. The upper limit is set on their deposit interest rates by adding basis points to the central bank’s benchmark deposit rates, rather than multiplying the benchmark rates by a specific number. Exclusive: Banks Prepare to Lower Deposit Rates as Rate Cap Reform Takes Effect (caixinglobal.com) Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
China’s trade surplus expanded unexpectedly in June, rising to $51.5 billion from $45.5 billion. The wider surplus reflects an acceleration in exports to 32.2% y/y from 27.9% y/y. Meanwhile, imports slowed to 36.7% y/y from May’s 36.7% but still beat the…
The NFIB Small Business Optimism Index surprised to the upside in June, rising 2.9 points to 102.5 versus expectations of a tick down to 99.5. The NFIB report revealed that a net 28% of respondents plan to create new jobs in the next three months – a record…
The US consumer price index report for June surprised on the upside. Headline CPI accelerated to 5.4% y/y versus expectations of a 0.1pp decline to 4.9% y/y. Core CPI jumped to 4.5% y/y which is greater than the anticipated 0.2pp increase to 4.0 % y/y.…