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Highlights Spread Product: The macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries in US bond portfolios. High-Yield: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. EM Corporates: Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Feature Chart 1Fed Meeting Didn't Shock Credit Markets Last week’s report looked at how the June FOMC meeting prompted a massive re-shaping of the Treasury curve.1 It didn’t discuss, however, the impact that June’s meeting had on credit spreads. There’s a simple reason for this. Corporate bond spreads didn’t move very much post-FOMC. In fact, neither investment grade nor high-yield spreads have widened significantly during the past two weeks, despite the Fed’s apparent “hawkish turn” (Chart 1). The VIX jumped briefly above 20 in the days following the Fed meeting but it has since re-discovered its lows (Chart 1, bottom panel). This week’s report considers whether the corporate bond market is too complacent. The first section updates our assessment of where we are in the credit cycle based on two indicators that did see large swings post-Fed. The second section updates our outlook for high-yield defaults and considers whether junk spreads continue to offer adequate compensation. Finally, the third section of this report presents an introductory look at valuation in the USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) corporate sector. We find that, for the most part, investment grade EM corporates are attractively valued relative to EM sovereigns and US corporates of the same credit rating and duration. Credit Cycle Update Chart 2Credit Cycle Indicators As we have repeatedly stated in past research, the slope of the yield curve is a very important credit cycle indicator.2 We have documented that spread product tends to outperform duration-matched Treasuries by a wide margin when the yield curve is steep. This outperformance tapers off once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope falls below 50 bps and it falls off even more when the slope dips below zero.3 With that in mind, it is notable that the Treasury curve flattened dramatically following the June FOMC meeting (Chart 2). At 106 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains well above the 50 bps threshold that would start to get concerning for spread product. However, it’s likely that the yield curve will continue to flatten as we approach a Fed rate hike in 2022. In other words, we expect that monetary conditions will turn sufficiently restrictive for us to reduce our recommended spread product allocation within the next 12-18 months. On the other hand, one positive development for spread product returns is that the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate declined following the June FOMC meeting. In fact, it is now below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 2, bottom panel). This is a positive development for spread product because the Fed will strive to ensure that monetary conditions stay accommodative at least until these long-dated inflation expectations are consistent with the 2.3% to 2.5% target. Or put differently, a rebound in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates back to the target range will slow the near-term pace of curve flattening, giving the credit cycle a small amount of extra running room. In short, the macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Investment Grade Corporates The highly supportive macro environment applies to investment grade corporate bonds, just as it does to all spread sectors. However, investment grade corporates have the problem that valuation is extremely tight. Much like a flat yield curve environment, a tight spread environment tends to coincide with low excess corporate bond returns. However, our research reveals that tight spreads alone are not sufficient for investment grade corporates to underperform duration-matched Treasuries. Table 1 classifies each month since May 1973 based on the investment grade corporate bond spread and the 3/10 Treasury slope. It then shows a 90% confidence interval for corporate bond excess returns during the following 12 months. It shows that, even when the corporate bond spread is below 100 bps (it is 81 bps today), investment grade corporates still tend to outperform duration-matched Treasuries as long as the 3/10 Treasury slope is above 50 bps. Table 1Expected 12-Month Corporate Bond Excess Return* (BPs) Based On OAS And Yield Curve Slope Bottom Line: The yield curve has started to flatten but it remains very steep, consistent with spread product outperforming duration-matched Treasuries. We remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries but will re-consider this position once the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. We expect this could happen within the next 12-18 months. We maintain only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds because of stretched valuations. We see more attractive opportunities in high-yield corporates (see next section), municipal bonds, USD-denominated EM sovereigns and USD-denominated EM corporates (see final section below). High-Yield Default Update We last updated our default rate outlook in March.4 At that time, we concluded that junk spreads offered adequate compensation for expected default losses. Since then, we have received nonfinancial corporate sector profit and debt growth data for the first quarter of 2021, crucial inputs to our macro-based default rate model. Our macro-based model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (i.e. pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards (Chart 3). Lending standards enter our model with a lag, but we need a forward-looking estimate of gross leverage for our model to generate predictions. Chart 3Macro-Driven Default Rate Model To estimate gross leverage we first model corporate profit growth based on real GDP (Chart 4) and assume that real GDP grows by 7% over the next four quarters, consistent with the Fed’s median forecast. This gives us a profit growth expectation of roughly 30%. Chart 4Profit & Debt Growth We also need an estimate for corporate debt growth. Corporate debt exploded last year, growing 10% in 2020, but it then slowed to an annualized rate of 4% in Q1 2021. We think corporate debt growth will remain slow going forward. The nonfinancial corporate sector financing gap has been negative in each of the past four quarters (Chart 4, bottom panel), meaning that retained earnings have exceeded capital expenditures. In other words, firms have built up a lot of excess capital that can be deployed in place of debt to finance new investment opportunities. Table 2 shows our model’s predicted 12-month default rate based on different assumptions for profit and debt growth. If we assume corporate profit growth of 30% and corporate debt growth between 0% and 8%, then our model predicts that the 12-month default rate will fall from its current 5.5% to a range of 2.3% - 2.8%. Table 2Default Rate Scenarios Next, we need to consider what sort of expected default rate is priced into the High-Yield index. Our analysis of historical junk spreads and returns suggests that we should require a minimum excess spread of 100 bps in the High-Yield index after subtracting default losses to be confident that junk bonds will outperform Treasuries.5 If we also assume a recovery rate of 40% on defaulted debt, then we calculate that the High-Yield index is fairly priced for a 12-month default rate of 2.9% (Chart 5). That is, junk spreads appear slightly cheap compared to the 2.3% - 2.8% range predicted by our macro model.  Finally, it’s worth noting that actual corporate default events have been quite rare in recent months. In the first five months of 2021 we’ve seen between 1 and 3 default events per month. If we extrapolate that trend and assume we see 3 defaults per month going forward, then we calculate that the 12-month trailing default rate will fall to 2.0% by December, before leveling off at 2.2% (Chart 6). In other words, the recent trend has been one of significantly fewer defaults than predicted by our macro model Chart 5Spread-Implied Default Rate Chart 6Recent Default Trends Bottom Line: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. An Attractive Opportunity In EM Corporates This week we present an introductory look at the risk/reward opportunity in USD-denominated EM corporate bonds. Specifically, we look at the investment grade Bloomberg Barclays USD-denominated EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index. We compare this index to both the investment grade USD-denominated EM Sovereign index and the US Credit index.6 First, we look at recent performance trends and average index statistics (Table 3). Both the EM Corporate and EM Sovereign indexes have average credit ratings between A and Baa, so we compare their performance to the A-rated and Baa-rated US Credit indexes. We observe a significant option-adjusted spread (OAS) advantage in both the EM indexes, though part of the extra spread offered by the Sovereign index is compensation for its longer duration. The EM Corporate index sticks out as offering an extremely attractive OAS per unit of duration. Table 3Performance Trends & Index Statistics As for performance, we see that the EM Corporate index experienced less of a drawdown (in excess return terms) during the COVID recession, though it has also returned less than both the EM Sovereign index and the Baa Credit index during the recent upswing. Chart 7Spreads Versus Credit Rating & Duration-Matched US Credit Next, we look at each individual credit tier of both the EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index and the EM Sovereign index, and we calculate the spread relative to a credit rating and duration-matched position in the US Credit index (Chart 7). In general, we see that both EM indexes offer a spread advantage versus duration-matched US Credit across all credit rating tiers. EM sovereigns look better than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. This is the result of attractive spreads on the sovereign bonds of UAE and Qatar. However, EM corporates clearly dominate sovereigns in both the A and Baa credit tiers. Finally, we consider the risk/reward trade-off in our EM indexes by using our Excess Return Bond Map. Our Excess Return Bond Map shows the relationship between expected return (on the vertical axis) and risk (on the horizontal axis). In Chart 8A our risk measure is the 12-month spread widening required for each index to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries divided by that index’s historical spread volatility. It can be thought of as the number of standard deviations of spread widening required for the index to provide an excess return of -100 bps. A higher value corresponds to less risk, and vice-versa. Chart 8B uses the same risk measurement, only we use the spread widening required to lose 500 bps versus Treasuries to assess the risk of a large drawdown. Both Charts 8A and 8B use OAS as the measure of expected return. Chart 8AExcess Return Bond Map (100 BPs Loss Threshold) Chart 8BExcess Return Bond Map (500 BPs Loss Threshold) The first thing that sticks out in Charts 8A & 8B is that Baa-rated EM corporates offer greater expected return and less risk than the EM Sovereign index and the Baa US Credit Index. This is true whether our loss threshold is set at 100 bps or 500 bps. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to split the EM Sovereign index by credit tier in these charts. A-rated EM corporates offer slightly less expected return than the EM Sovereign index but with significantly less risk, they also clearly dominate the A-rated US Credit Index. Aa-rated EM corporates appear to offer a similar risk/reward trade-off as the EM Sovereign index, though we know from Chart 7 that sovereigns have a spread advantage in the Aa credit tier. The bottom line is that USD-denominated EM corporates are attractively valued relative to investment grade US corporate bonds with the same duration and credit rating. EM corporates also look preferable to EM sovereigns in the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns are more attractive than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How To Re-Shape The Yield Curve Without Really Trying”, dated June 22, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think”, dated May 25, 2021. 3 We use the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope in place of the more widely tracked 2-year/10-year slope in our credit cycle research only because using the 3-year/10-year slope allows us to include more historical cycles in our analysis. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “That Uneasy Feeling”, dated March 30, 2021. 5 Please see page 33 of the US Bond Strategy Quarterly Chartpack, “Testing The Limits Of Transitory Inflation”, dated May 18, 2021. 6 The US Credit Index consists predominantly of US corporate bonds, but also some non-corporate credit such as: Sovereigns, Foreign Agencies, Domestic Agencies, Local Authority bonds and Supranationals. 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Highlights Economy – As always, there is no lack of things that could go wrong: COVID-19 could have a resurgence, international softness could be a drag, wage growth could erode profit margins or trigger inflation and households may simply sit on their newly accumulated savings. Markets – High valuations across the board leave stock and bond markets with little margin for error: High valuations make markets more fragile, but they won’t suffer a sharp decline in the absence of a negative catalyst. Strategy – Stay the course but remain vigilant: Investors should game plan for adverse scenarios, commit to shortening holding periods and be prepared to make big changes if an inflection point is closer than we expect. Feature Thus far in the pandemic era, it has been right to be constructive on markets and the economy. The Fed, Congress and the White House succeeded in their efforts to shelter the economy from the virus and investors in equities and spread product have been richly rewarded for betting that they would. So far this year, the combination of potent growth and easy monetary policy has allowed the economy to travel a comfortable path between the slumping and overheating extremes that would upend financial markets’ progress and cloud the expansion’s future. Though our base case calls for benign conditions to persist well into 2022, that scenario is not assured. As we ask ourselves how we could be getting it wrong, we see four primary threats to our view. We do not judge that any of them are worryingly likely in isolation, but we are monitoring all of them while watching for other challenges that may emerge. Testing our assumptions is an established part of our process but we are especially vigilant given the novel conditions imposed by the pandemic and the policy responses to it. The magnitude of the swings in this cycle, and the compressed period over which they’ve occurred, are atypical and do not fit into established templates. Conditions are unusually uncertain and investment strategy needs to account for it. The Pandemic Isn’t Over The foremost threat to our sanguine take is a COVID-19 resurgence. A flare-up of global infections, hospitalizations and deaths would presumably trigger renewed rounds of shutdowns in the hardest-hit countries, crimping local economic activity. If a resurgent pandemic dragged on output in enough places, the post-pandemic revival would be delayed, and global growth would not accelerate as quickly as it otherwise would. Although the US and other countries with high vaccination rates should be largely sheltered from an outbreak, there is no such thing as complete decoupling in a globalized world, even for a comparatively closed economy like the US. The good news is that deaths have plunged with infections (Chart 1), and hospitalizations have, too. Not only are fewer people becoming infected, their cases are becoming increasingly less severe. The phenomenon is not confined to the US; humankind has learned much better ways to treat COVID over the last year-plus. The pandemic is still with us, but its consequences are less severe, even with new, more contagious variants. Chart 1What A Difference A Year Makes Lessened severity could help the US withstand an ongoing slowdown in the pace of vaccinations (Chart 2). A significant proportion of Americans appears to be fiercely opposed to getting vaccinated, and much of the low-hanging blue-state fruit may already have been picked (Chart 3). Vaccinations are not the only route to herd immunity, however, and it is not at all unrealistic to think that an immunization rate around 60-70% might be sufficient to stifle COVID’s spread. Chart 2Vaccination Progress Is Slowing ... Chart 3... As The Most Eager Have Already Gotten Their Doses The Center for Disease Control estimates that less than a quarter of COVID infections have been detected and reported,1 suggesting that 88 million citizens may have been unknowingly infected and are therefore immune. If one-third of those unknowingly infected have not been vaccinated, in line with the currently eligible population, the additional 29 million people would push the US very close to 75% of the 12-and-above population with antibodies against infection. If children under 12 can receive the vaccine in the fall, the end of the pandemic stage in the US may be within sight. Our glass-half-full perspective would be tested if new vaccine-resistant variants were to emerge. However, the evidence so far indicates that the existing vaccines have held firm against all known variants. COVID is new and continually evolving, so we cannot definitively say that the US is out of the woods. We will have to keep watching infection counts and looking out for evidence of vaccine-resistant strains, but for now the weight of the available evidence suggests that a COVID resurgence is not likely to pull the rug out from under the US economy. Global Softness Our Chinese Investment Strategy service expects that Chinese growth will decelerate over the rest of the year as total social financing growth slows (Chart 4). With the major developing economies recovering as they catch up to China in terms of stifling the virus and Chinese consumption growing nicely, officials can advance their deleveraging aims without materially pressuring the domestic economy. The upshot is that Chinese growth will downshift a bit and its import appetite will wane. Chart 4China Is Poised To Decelerate In The Second Half Of The Year   China’s imports are its trading partners’ exports and they are the channel by which it most directly impacts the global economy. Slowing Chinese import demand means slowing global growth, all else equal. Although the US is not a big exporter to China, the multinationals that dominate the S&P 500 will feel a bit of a drag from reduced Chinese demand. As COVID’s threat diminishes, however, the major developed economies should have enough momentum to overcome a slight Chinese downshift. Cost Pressures Wages account for the largest proportion of most businesses’ costs and a rapid rise could squeeze profit margins. Wage negotiations ultimately turn on the balance of labor supply and demand and management’s and labor’s recourse to substitutes for workers or jobs. Presently, demand for low-skilled workers far exceeds supply, and those workers are much more able to find alternative jobs than management can conjure up substitutes for servers, bartenders, bellhops, front-desk staff and gate agents. Even if employers were able to raise prices enough to protect their margins, the emergence of cost-push inflation pressures would ultimately hurt financial assets. Labor also has the upper hand, at least directionally, in terms of three other key leverage drivers (Figure 1). A trend toward increasing economic concentration has favored employers for decades, but antipathy for the largest technology companies is one of the only things Republican and Democratic lawmakers seem to share. The regulatory and legal trends that have favored employers in labor-management relations since the Reagan administration will shift under Biden’s direction and even if the midterm elections strip the Democrats of their control of Capitol Hill, the ESG movement and a shrinking working-age population (Chart 5) will likely bring down the curtain on four decades of one-sided support for employers. The labor-management rubber band,2 a link illustrating the symbiosis between workers and businesses, has stretched nearly to the breaking point and both parties must respond to constituents who want to see labor recover some of its lost income share. Figure 1Workers Can Look Forward To A More Friendly Environment Chart 5You're Gonna Miss Me When I'm Gone Despite labor’s growing clout, however, the main compensation series show that wage growth is decelerating. A large part of the issue is that the unskilled workers with the most leverage make the least money. Their gains do not move the needle nearly as much as highly skilled knowledge workers whose positions may have become more tenuous amidst the pandemic shift to remote work as businesses rethink how many white-collar workers are needed. We also continue to expect labor supply concerns to recede once schools reopen and unemployment insurance benefit supplements expire, easing potential upward pressure on wages. What If The Savings Aren’t Spent? We estimate that US households have accumulated about $2.4 trillion in excess savings since March 2020. The excess cash gives them plenty of dry powder to direct to the services they have not been able to consume freely over the last year-plus. Households are also on a better footing after having paid down about 6% of their outstanding credit card balances and 4% of their outstanding mortgage principal. Thanks to rock-bottom interest rates, servicing the debt they still have is far less burdensome than it used to be (Chart 6). Households are flush and if just half of their extra savings are directed to consumption, the economy will have a powerful tailwind through 2022. Chart 6A Decade Of Low Rates Has Helped Main Street, Too The year-over-year change in the 4-quarter moving average of real disposable income has grown at its fastest rate since 1951 (Chart 7). Before the pandemic, changes in real disposable income explained two-thirds of the variability in real consumption (Chart 8, top panel). Over the four pandemic quarters ended in 1Q21, however, consumption has declined despite robust income growth (Chart 8, bottom panel). Is the break in the established relationship temporary, or does it mark an inflection? Chart 7Income Growth Has Taken Off ... Chart 8... And That's Usually Reflected In Spending Our view is that it is temporary, driven by the consumption-dampening impact of stay-at-home orders and social distancing measures as well as the fact that many popular services were unavailable. We do not know for sure, however, as the current situation has no close analogue. Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis posits that households are less prone to spend temporary windfalls than recurring income. Households that didn’t have to spend their economic impact payments upon receipt may view them as one-off windfalls and choose to sit on them. Investment Implications The uncertain macro backdrop coincides with ambitious valuations in debt and equity markets. Corporate bond spreads are near all-time lows (Chart 9) and the S&P 500 is trading at a historically pricey 22 times forward four-quarter earnings. Financial assets have little margin for error at levels that imply investors are pricing in a lot of good news. It will require a negative catalyst to trigger their vulnerability, however, and they are poised to continue along their merry way if the potential threats discussed above do not materialize. Chart 9What Recession? We are not complacent about the potential for trouble and investors shouldn’t be, either. Everyone should adjust their conviction levels lower given the unusual nature of the pandemic-influenced conditions. We continue to recommend that investors remain overweight equities and spread product in multi-asset portfolios, but we also advise shortening expected holding periods and developing a detailed plan of action in the event of significant negative surprises. We expect that the just-right Goldilocks backdrop of strong growth and easy monetary policy will remain in place through 2022, but investors should be prepared to implement an alternative course of action if it doesn’t.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 As of April 14th, the CDC estimates that only 1 of every 4.3 infections between February 2020 and March 2021 were reported. Estimated Disease Burden of COVID-19 | CDC Accessed June 23, 2021. 2 Please see the US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Labor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them”, dated January 20, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.  
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According to BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategy service, the rally in the US dollar will be short-lived. The FX market’s reaction to the Federal Reserve’s hawkish shift was violent. From a low of 90.5 last week, the DXY index rallied 2% and currently…
Special Report Dear client, In lieu of our weekly bulletin next Friday, I will be hosting a webcast on Tuesday, June 29 to discuss the latest trends in FX markets, given the hawkish shift by the Federal Reserve. I hope to answer your questions during this webcast. Kind regards, Chester Ntonifor, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights The hawkish shift by the Federal Reserve last week jolted the dollar higher, but our bias is that the rally will be quite short-lived. The primary reason is that US real rates will remain depressed, relative to the rest of the world, for the foreseeable future. The US balance of payments backdrop continues to deteriorate suggesting that the willingness by foreign concerns to fund the trade deficit will be a drag on the dollar. Global trade is staging a recovery. Historically, this has been synonymous with stronger global growth and a weaker dollar. Most countries are seeing foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows accelerate in the first few months of 2021, on the back of potential profitable investment projects. This is set to continue. The advantage appears to be particularly pronounced in commodity-producing countries that are witnessing a strong terms-of-trade tailwind. Feature Chart I-1The Dollar Rallied Hard On The Fed Shift Last week, the Federal Reserve surprised markets with a hawkish shift. First, the median dots suggested at least two rate hikes by the end of 2023, a shift from the March communiqué where no rate hikes were expected until 2024. Second, the Fed revised its inflation forecast for 2021, from 2.4% to 3.4%, while suggesting that this should still be transitory. Longer-term inflation expectations were left largely unchanged. Finally, the discussion around tapering was acknowledged, which was interpreted as a sign that the Fed was inching closer to withdrawing monetary stimulus. The reaction in the FX market was violent. From a low of 90.5 last week, the DXY index rallied 2% and currently sits at 91.8. The most hit currencies were procyclical, even where central bankers have been more hawkish than the Fed, such as Norway and New Zealand (Chart I-1). Our initial take was that the market moves were a knee-jerk reaction, likely to be sustained in the coming weeks and months but would prove fleeting. As we finally digest the implications of the Federal Reserve’s shift, it is difficult to make the case for a sustainable rally in the US dollar. The jump in the dollar coincided with an upward revision in market expectations for rate hikes in 2022 and 2023. Markets now expect the Fed to lift interest rates by 34 bps in 2022 and an additional 51 bps in 2023. Notably, this is higher than what the market expected at the start of the year (Chart I-2, top panel). On the surface, this explains the dollar rally. But market interest rate expectations between the US and the rest of the world were largely unchanged, as real rates moved higher almost everywhere within the G10 (Chart I-2, bottom panel). From this perspective, the dollar rally was largely an overreaction. Higher inflation in the US, especially compared to the rest of the world, has usually been a bearish development for the dollar. The simple reason is that the fair value of the currency incrementally declines on a purchasing power parity basis. Therefore, the Federal Reserve’s adjustment higher of US inflation should not have reinvigorated bulls, unless they believe the Fed will actively move ahead of the inflation curve (Chart I-3). We did not get such a reading from last week’s release. And given that the US is generating the fastest inflation in the G10 and has the sole central bank targeting an inflation overshoot, our bias is that real rates will remain depressed for the foreseeable future Chart I-2Long-Term Rates Did Not Shift In Favor Of The Dollar Chart I-3Higher Inflation In The US Is Negative For The Greenback The Fed suggested that discussions have begun around tapering, but again, this was little reason for a rally in the dollar. Market participants had already expected tapering to begin sometime next year (Table I-1A and I-1B). Meanwhile, the Fed reiterated that any tapering discussions will be communicated well in advance. It is also worth noting that the Fed is lagging other central banks in tapering asset purchases, notably the Bank of Canada. Table 1AMarket Participants Already Expect The Fed To Taper Next Year Table I-1BMarket Participants Already Expect The Fed To Taper Next Year The above analysis suggests that the Fed provided an excuse for an oversold dollar to bounce higher, rather than trigger a sea change in the currency outlook. So, from a tactical perspective, the rally could continue, pushing us towards 94 on the DXY. However, longer term, the underlying drivers of the dollar suggest a bearish view remains appropriate. This week’s report focuses on one such longer-term driver – the balance of payments. The US trade deficit continues to widen at an accelerating pace, while improving in many other countries. From this perspective, the willingness by foreign concerns to fund the trade deficit will continue to be a drag on the dollar. Global Trade And The Dollar In Q1 2021, global trade was higher than pre-crisis levels, rising 10% year-on-year. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the strong rebound continues to be driven by the strong exports from East Asian economies. These trends are expected to continue in the near-term, especially once trade in services can resume in earnest on the back of vaccination progress. Chart I-4US Balance Of Payments Are Negative For The Dollar Global FDI inflows should also begin to rebound going into next year, following a tumultuous decline in 2020. According to UNCTAD, global FDI inflows plunged by 35%, bringing total FDI inflows to below US$1 trillion. As reinvested earnings make up a huge share of total FDI, the earnings decline last year curtailed flows. Looking ahead, UNCTAD expects FDI flows to recover fully in 2022, under their optimistic scenario. Over the much longer term, the headwinds to trade and FDI flows remain, including rising protectionism, global onshoring of production and geopolitical tensions. De-globalization is here to stay, as policymakers promote more regulation and intervention in key industries. That said, over the next few years, balance of payments dynamics will remain important and could be the key driver for currencies, as investors become more discerning between countries and sectors with a high return on capital and those without. In this report, we look at the balance-of-payment dynamics in the G10. Specifically, the basic balance, which takes the sum of the current account and net long-term capital inflows (and therefore tends to measure the underlying competitiveness of a currency more accurately). On this basis, Sweden, the euro area, Australia and Norway sport the best surpluses, while the US is the worst (Chart I-4). United States Chart I-5US Balance Of Payments The US basic balance is deteriorating at an accelerating pace (Chart I-5). Just this week, the current account balance for Q1 came in at -$195.7 billion, the widest in over a decade. This is also occurring at a time when FDI inflows are deteriorating. If this trend continues, it could continue to undermine the US currency. The basic balance is approaching -4% of GDP. This has reversed most of the improvement in the basic balance since the Global Financial Crisis. This confirms our bias that the dollar likely put in a major top last year and has entered a multi-year decline. On portfolio flows, the most recent TIC data show that US Treasurys were aggressively bought in March and April by foreigners. Equity inflows also remain strong. However, should US real rates remain deeply negative, this will curtail foreign appetite for US government bonds, and require an adjustment lower in the dollar.           Euro Area Chart I-6Euro Area Balance Of Payments The euro area maintains a structural current account surplus, which has been improving in recent quarters (Chart I-6). Since the beginning of the year, the surplus has increased from €5.8 billion to €31.4 billion in April. Meanwhile, after about two decades of underinvestment in the euro area, FDI inflows are now at the strongest level, to the tune of about 2% of GDP. This is nudging the euro area’s basic balance to a record 4% of GDP. A rising basic balance surplus has been one of the key pillars underpinning a bullish euro thesis. This is likely to persist, as strong FDI inflows, especially in the green energy sector, continue. Portfolio investment has turned strongly negative in recent quarters, but this is likely a crowding out of bond investors by strong purchases from the ECB. Meanwhile, the euro area generates a surplus of savings that need to be reinvested abroad.             Japan Chart I-7Japan Balance Of Payments Ever since the Fukushima crisis, the Japanese trade balance has been severely hampered by rising energy imports. The key pillar for the basic balance surplus is income receipts from Japan’s large investment positions abroad. This should continue to keep the basic balance in surplus, albeit at lower levels than a decade ago (Chart I-7). Going forward, the Japanese trade balance should keep improving as exports maintain their strong growth. On the service side of the equation, foreign visitors should also increase, especially as the Olympics move ahead. At their peak, foreign visitors were about 2% of the Japanese population, compared to almost nil today. The improvement in the goods and services balance should nudge the basic balance above 2% of GDP in the coming quarters. Net portfolio investments are accelerating, especially given the recent underperformance of Japanese equities (making them cheap), and positive real rates from longer-term Japanese corporate and government bonds.         United Kingdom Chart I-8UK Balance Of Payments The UK trade and current account balance is deteriorating again, on the back of a more tumultuous post-Brexit transition. This has nudged the basic balance into negative territory (Chart I-8). The strong rally in the pound has also chiselled away some of the competitive edge British goods commanded on a global landscape. Significant foreign direct investment will be necessary to prevent the pound from adjusting much lower. There is progress, as the Conservative government has signed some significant trade deals over the course of the year. This should assuage foreign investor concerns over the potential for market access, should they invest in UK production. Portfolio investment in the UK has rolled over, but this is likely to be temporary if global equity markets remain resilient. Real rates are also improving in the UK, which should stem bond outflows. The key for the pound in the coming years will be productivity improvements which will allow foreign investors to keep financing the trade deficit.         Canada Chart I-9Canada Balance Of Payments The Canadian basic balance has modestly improved, after being flat for over a decade. The improvement has been in the current account and is specifically driven by income receipts from Canada’s improving net international investment position (Chart I-9). Foreign direct investment has also remained resilient, and should remain so, given strong commodity prices. Canada is one of the largest exporters of crude oil, meaning the increase in petroleum prices will buffet the trade balance. In fact, since the 2020 lows, the monthly trade balance has recovered from almost negative C$6 billion to C$0.6 billion in April. Today, the basic balance stands at a surplus of 1% of GDP and should continue to improve.                   Australia Chart I-10Australia Balance Of Payments Australia sports the best improvement in both its trade and current account balance over the last few years. This has pushed the basic balance near a record 3.75% of GDP (Chart I-10). Australia’s long affair with a current account deficit is over. Investment in projects in the resource space are now bearing fruit, easing the external funding requirement. This has ended the 35-year-long deficit in the current account. Australia’s comparative advantage in exports of LNG will likely be the next key driver of the trade balance, replacing coal shipments. This is consistent with the ESG megatrend. Net portfolio investment has been falling for years, but this just reflects Australia’s rising savings. In other words, the current account surplus is being recycled abroad. In short, the Aussie dollar has a large amount of running room, albeit, barring a tactical correction.             New Zealand Chart I-11New Zealand Balance Of Payments The New Zealand basic balance has been negative for many years, only recently going into balance (Chart I-11). The boom in agricultural prices has helped boost the trade balance into surplus, but this has not been sufficient to bring the current account into balance. Coupon and dividend payments to foreign investors, as well as valuation adjustments from net foreign liabilities have keep the current account in structural deficit. Portfolio investments are accelerating out of New Zealand. The last time they hit -8% of GDP was just after the financial crisis. It is not clear why foreign investors are shunning this rather defensive market, but high valuations may be playing a key role. Importantly, FDI inflows remain steady, near 1.75% of GDP. Going forward, New Zealand should continue to see modest improvement in its basic balance, especially relative to the US, supporting the kiwi.           Switzerland Chart I-12Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland has had a structural uptrend in its trade balance for decades (Chart I-12). This has buffeted both the current account and the basic balance. It has also allowed the trade-weighted Swiss franc to outperform on a structural basis. In Q1, the current account surplus rose to CHF 16 billion, a 60% increase from Q1 2020, driven by an improvement in the goods trade balance. However, both primary and secondary income were a drag on the current account balance. The net international investment position also improved on the back of a net increase in foreign asset purchases. However, a strong dollar in Q1 reduced the net value of foreign currencies in the portfolio. The positive balance-of-payment backdrop continues to create a headache for the Swiss National Bank. CHF has been weak this year, and the SNB will likely continue to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to calm future appreciation in the franc. That said, we expect the trade-weighted franc to rise on a structural basis.          Norway Chart I-13Norway Balance Of Payments Norway’s trade balance was heavily hit by the COVID-19 crisis but is slowly recovering (Chart I-13). The trade surplus started to plunge sharply due to falling energy prices at the beginning of the lockdown. Going forward, the reopening of the global economy, especially Europe, will benefit Norwegian exports of oil and gas. Meanwhile, tepid investment in global oil and gas extraction over the past five years will ensure Norway’s terms of trade remains robust. This will especially be the case thanks to growing production from the new Johan Sverdrup field. From a more fundamental perspective, the krone will also benefit from positive income flows. Norway has one of the biggest NIIPs in the world, which generates large income receipts that skew heavily toward equity dividends. This characteristic strengthens the bond between the NOK and global equities, making it the perfect procyclical currency. On a structural basis, the Norwegian krone faces challenges. Declining productivity suggests that economic growth in Norway will be more inflationary. This will lower the fair value of the real exchange rate. Therefore, while we are positive on the NOK over the next 18 to 24 months, we will be cognizant not to overstay our welcome.   Sweden Chart I-14Sweden Balance Of Payments The Swedish current account balance has improved smartly in the last few quarters, boosting the basic balance to a surplus of over 5% of GDP. While the trade surplus has certainly improved, the primary income surplus has been the key driver (Chart I-14). FDI inflows have not had a strong impact on the basic balance. In terms of portfolio investment, this has turned negative as Riksbank purchases have crowded out investors. Income receipts have also needed to be recycled. In conclusion, the Swedish krona remains one of our favorite currencies due to its increasing basic balance surplus and its cheap valuation. We were stopped out of our long Nordic basket trade (NOK and SEK) against both the euro and the US dollar but will be looking to re-establish at more attractive levels.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights The US is withdrawing from the Middle East and South Asia and making a strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. The third quarter will see risks flare around Iran and the US rejoin the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. The result is briefly negative for oil prices but the rise of Iran is a new geopolitical trend that will increase Middle Eastern risk over the long run. The geopolitical outlook is dollar bullish, while the macroeconomic outlook is getting less dollar-bearish due to China’s risk of over-tightening policy. Stay neutral USD and be wary of commodities and emerging markets in the third quarter. European political risk is bottoming. The German and French elections are at best minor risks. However, the continent is ripe for negative black swans, especially due to Russian aggression. Go tactically long global large caps and defensives. Feature Chart 1Three Key Views On Track (So Far) We chose “No Return To Normalcy” as the theme of our 2021 outlook. While the COVID-19 vaccine promised economic recovery, we argued that normalization would create complacency regarding fundamental changes that have taken place in the geopolitical environment. A contradiction between an improving macroeconomic backdrop and a foreboding geopolitical backdrop would develop in 2021 and beyond. The “reflation trade” has begun to lose steam as we go to press. However, global recovery will still be the dominant story in the second half of the year as vaccination spreads. The question for the third quarter and the rest of the year is whether reflation will continue. As a matter of forecasting, we think it will. But as a matter of investment strategy, we are taking a more defensive stance until China relaxes economic policy. In our annual outlook we highlighted three key geopolitical views: (1) China’s headwinds, both at home and abroad (2) US détente with Iran and pivot to Asia (3) Europe’s opportunity. All three trends are broadly on track and can be illustrated by looking at equity performance in the relevant regions for the year so far: Chinese stocks sold off, UAE stocks rallied, and European stocks rallied (Chart 1). However, these trends are not exclusively tied to absolute equity performance. The most important question is what happens to global growth and the US dollar as these three key views continue. Stay Neutral On The Dollar It paid off for us to maintain a neutral stance on the dollar. True, the global recovery and exorbitant US trade and budget deficits are bearish for the dollar and bullish for other currencies. But the greenback’s “counter-trend bounce” is proving more formidable than many investors expected. The fundamentals of the American economy and global position remain strong. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the US has secured its recovery with fiscal policy, maintained rule of law amid a contested election, innovated and distributed vaccines, benefited from more flexible social restrictions, refurbished global alliances, and put pressure on its geopolitical rivals. In essence, the combined effect of President Trump’s and Biden’s policies has been to make America “great again” (Chart 2). From a geopolitical perspective, the dollar is appealing. Chart 2Trump-Biden Make America Great Again? In addition, the first two geopolitical views mentioned above – China’s headwinds and the US-Iran détente – imply a negative environment for China and the renminbi. The reason for the US to do a suboptimal deal with Iran, both in 2015 and 2021, is to reduce the risk of war and buy time to enable a strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. Three US presidents have been elected on the pledge to conclude the “forever wars” in the Middle East and South Asia. Biden is withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in September. There can be little doubt Biden is committed to an Iran deal, which is supposed to free up the US’s hands (Chart 3). Meanwhile the US public and Congress are unified in their desire to better defend US interests against China’s economic and military rise. There has not yet been a stabilization of US-China policies. Biden is not likely to hold a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping until late October at earliest – and that is a guess, not a confirmed summit. The Biden administration has completed its review of China policy and is maintaining the Trump administration’s hawkish posture, as predicted. The US and China may resume their strategic and economic dialogue at some point but it is impossible to go back to the status quo ante 2015. That was the year the US adopted a more confrontational stance toward China – a stance later supercharged by Trump’s election and trade tariffs. The hawkish consensus on China is one of the rare unifying factors in a deeply divided America. The Biden administration explicitly says the US-China relationship is now defined by “competition” instead of “engagement.”1 One exception to this neutral view on the dollar has been our decision to go long the Japanese yen and Swiss franc, which has not panned out so far. Our reasoning is that geopolitical risk will boost these currencies but otherwise the reduction of geopolitical risk will weigh on the dollar in the context of global growth recovery. So far geopolitical risk has remained subdued while the US dollar has outperformed. We are still sympathetic to these safe-haven currencies, however, as they are attractively valued as long as one expects geopolitical risks to materialize (Chart 4). Chart 3US Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran Our third key view, that EU was the real winner of the US election last year, remains on track. This is marginally positive for the euro at the expense of the dollar. Given the above points, we favor an equal-weighted basket of the euro and the dollar relative to the renminbi (Chart 5). Chart 4Safe-Haven Currencies Attractive Chart 5Favor Euro And Dollar Over Renminbi The geopolitical outlook is dollar-bullish. The macroeconomic outlook is dollar-bearish, except that China’s economy looks to slow down. We expect China to ease policy in the second half of the year but it may come late. We remain neutral dollar in the third quarter. Wait For China To Relax Policy July 1 marks the centenary of the Communist Party of China. The main thing investors should know is that the Communist Party predates China’s capitalist phase by sixty years. The party adopted capitalism to improve the economy – it never sacrificed its political or foreign policy goals. This poses a major geopolitical problem today because the Communist Party’s consolidation of power across Greater China, symbolized by Beijing’s revocation of Hong Kong’s special status in 2019, has convinced the western democracies that China is no longer compatible with the liberal world order. China launched a 13.8% of GDP monetary-and-fiscal stimulus over 2018-20 due to the trade war and COVID-19 pandemic. So the economy is stable for the hundredth anniversary celebration. The centenary goals are largely accomplished: GDP is larger, poverty is nearly extinguished, although urban incomes are still lagging (Chart 6). General Secretary Xi Jinping will mark the occasion with a speech. The speech will contribute to his governing philosophy, Xi Jinping Thought, a synthesis of communist Mao Zedong Thought and the pro-capitalist “socialism with Chinese characteristics” pioneered by General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s-90s. The effect is to reassert Communist Party and central government primacy after the long period of decentralization that enabled China’s rapid growth phase. It is also to endorse an inward economic turn after the four-decade export-manufacturing boom. The Xi administration’s re-centralization of policy has entailed mini-cycles of tightening and loosening control over the economy. The administration leans against the country’s tendency to gorge itself on debt and grow at any cost – until it must lean the other way for fear of triggering a destabilizing slowdown. For this reason Beijing tightened policy proactively last year, producing a sharp drop in money, credit, and fiscal expansion in 2021 that now threatens to undermine the global recovery. By our measures, any further tightening will result in undershooting the regime’s money and credit targets, i.e. overtightening, and hence threaten to drag on the global recovery (Chart 7). Chart 6China's Communist Party Centenary Goals Chart 7China Verges On Over-Tightening Policy Overtightening would be a policy mistake with potentially disastrous consequences. So the base case should be that the government will relax policy rather than undermine the post-COVID recovery. However, investors cannot be confident about the timing. The 2015 financial turmoil and renminbi devaluation occurred because policymakers reacted too slowly. One reason to believe policy will be eased is that after July 1 the government will turn its attention to the twentieth national party congress in 2022, the once-in-five-years rotation of the Central Committee and Politburo. The party congress begins at the local level at the beginning of next year and culminates in the fall of 2022 with the national rotation of top party leaders. Xi Jinping was originally slated to step down in 2022. So he needs to squash any last-minute push against him by opposing factions of the party. He may have himself named chairman of the Communist Party, like Mao before him. Most importantly he will put his stamp on the “seventh generation” of China’s leaders by promoting his followers into key positions. All of this suggests that the Xi administration cannot risk triggering a recession, even if its preferences remain hawkish on economic policy. Policy easing could come as early as the end of July. As a rule of thumb, we have noticed that the Politburo’s July meeting on economic policy is often an inflection point, as was the case in 2007, 2015, 2018, and 2020 (Table 1). Some observers claim the April Politburo meeting already signaled an easing in policy, although we do not see that. If July clearly signals relaxation, global investors will cheer and emerging market assets and commodities will rise. Table 1China’s Politburo Often Hits Inflection Point On Economic Policy In July Still we maintain a defensive posture going into the third quarter because we do not have a high level of confidence that policymakers will act preemptively. A market riot may precede and motivate the inflection point in policy. Also the negative impact of previous policy tightening will be felt in the third quarter. China plays and industrial metals are extremely vulnerable to further correction (Chart 8). Chart 8China Plays And Metals Vulnerable To Further Correction The earliest occasion for a Biden-Xi summit comes at the end of October, as mentioned. While US-China talks will occur at some level, relations will remain fundamentally unstable. While a Biden-Xi summit may improve the atmosphere and lead to a new round of strategic and economic dialogue, or Phase Two trade talks, the fact is that the US is seeking to contain China’s rise and China is seeking to break out of the strictures of the US-led world order. The global elite and mainstream media will put a lot of emphasis on the post-Trump return to diplomatic “normalcy” and summits. But this is to overemphasize style at the expense of substance. Note that the positive feelings of the Biden-Putin summit on June 16 fizzled in less than a week when Russia allegedly dropped bombs in the path of a British destroyer in the Black Sea. The US and UK were training Ukraine’s military. Britain denies any bombs were dropped but Russia says next time they will hit their target. (More on this below.) This episode is instructive for US-China relations: summitry is overrated. China is building a sphere of influence and the US no longer believes dialogue alone is the answer. Tit-for-tat punitive measures and proxy battles in China’s neighboring areas, from the Korean peninsula to the Taiwan Strait to the South and East China Seas, are the new normal. Bottom Line: Tactically, stay defensive on global risk assets, especially China plays. Strategically, maintain a constructive outlook on the cycle given the global recovery and China’s need eventually to relax monetary and fiscal policy. US-Iran Deal Likely – Then The Real Trouble Starts The US will likely rejoin the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) by August and pull out of its longest-ever war in Afghanistan in September. The US is wrapping up its “forever wars” to meet the demands of a war-weary public. Ironically, the long-term consequence is to create power vacuums that invite new geopolitical conflicts in the context of the US’s great power struggle with China and Russia. But for now a deal with Iran – once it is settled – reduces geopolitical risk by reducing the odds of military escalation in the region. The Iran talks are more significant than the Afghanistan pullout. We are confident in a deal because Biden can rejoin the 2015 deal unilaterally – it was never approved by the US Senate as a formal treaty. The Iranians will not support any militant action so aggressive as to scupper a deal that offers them the chance of reviving their economy at a critical time in the regime’s history. Reviving the deal poses a downside risk for oil prices in the third quarter though not over the long run. It is negative in the short run because investors will have to price not only Iran’s current and future production (Chart 9) but also any resulting loss of OPEC 2.0 discipline. Brent crude is trading at $76 per barrel as we go to press, above the $65-$70 per barrel average that our Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects to see over the coming five years (Chart 10). Chart 9Iran's Oil Production Will Return Chart 10Brent Price Faces Short-Term Downside Risk From Iranian Crude The oil price ceiling is enforced by the cartel of oil producers who fear that too high of prices will incentivize US shale oil production as well as the global shift to renewable energy. The Russians have always dragged their feet over oil production cuts and are now pushing for production hikes. The government needs an oil price of around $50-55 per barrel for the budget to break even. The Saudis need higher prices to break even, at $70-75 per barrel. Moscow must coordinate various oil producers, led by the country’s powerful oligarchs and their factions, which is inherently more difficult than the Saudi position of coordinating one producer, Aramco. The Russians and Saudis have maintained cartel discipline so far in 2021, as expected, because the wounds of the market-share war last year are still raw. They retreated from that showdown in less than a month. However, a major escalation in Saudi Arabia’s strategic conflict with Iran could push the Saudis to seek greater market share at Iran’s expense, as occurred before the original Iran deal in 2014-15. Hence our view that the risk to oil prices will shift from the upside to the downside in the second half of the year if the US-Iran deal is reconstituted. Over the long run, the deal is not negative for oil prices. The deal is a tradeoff for lower geopolitical risk today but higher risk in the future. The reason is that Iran’s economic recovery will strengthen its strategic hand and generate a backlash in the region. The global oil supply and demand balance will fluctuate according to circumstances but regional conflict will inject a risk premium over time. Biden’s likely decision to rejoin the 2015 deal should be seen as a delaying tactic. It is impossible to go back to 2015, when the US had mustered a coalition of nations to pressure Iran and when Iran’s “reformist” faction stood to receive a historic boost from the opening of the country’s economy. Now the US lacks a coalition and the reformists are leaving office in disgrace, with the hardliners (“principlists”) taking full power for the foreseeable future. Iran is happy to go back to complying with a deal that consists of sanctions relief in exchange for temporary limits on its nuclear program. The 2015 deal’s restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program begin expiring in 2023 and continue to expire through 2040. Biden has no chance of negotiating a newer and more expansive deal that extends these sunset clauses while also restricting Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional militant activities. He will say that easing sanctions is premised on a broader “follow on” deal to achieve these US goals. But the broader deal is unlikely to materialize anytime soon. The Iranians will commit to future talks but they will have no intention of agreeing to a more expansive deal unless forced. The country’s leaders will never abandon their nuclear program after witnessing the invasions of non-nuclear Libya and Ukraine – in stark contrast with nuclear-armed North Korea. Moreover Biden cannot possibly reassemble the P5+1 coalition with Russia and China anytime soon. The US is directly confronting these states. They could conceivably work with the US when Iran is on the brink of obtaining nuclear weapons but not before then. They did not prevent North Korea. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the soon-to-be-inaugurated President Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence, and other pillars of the regime are focused exclusively on strengthening the regime in advance of Khamenei’s impending succession sometime in the coming decade. The succession could easily lead to domestic unrest and a political crisis, which makes the 2020s a critical period for the Islamic Republic. With Tehran focused on a delicate succession, it is not a foregone conclusion that Iran will go on the offensive to expand its sphere of influence immediately after the US deal. But sooner or later a major new geopolitical trend will emerge: the rise of Iran. With sanctions removed, trade and investment increasing, and Chinese and Russian support, Iran will be capable of pursuing its strategic aims in the region more effectively. It will extend its influence across the “Shia Crescent,” including Iraq. The fear that this will inspire in Israel and the Gulf Arab states has already generated a slow-boiling war in the region. This war will intensify as the US will be reluctant to intervene. The purpose of the deal is to enable the war-weary US to reduce its active involvement in the region. The US foreign policy and defense establishment do not entirely see it this way – they emphasize that the US will remain engaged. But US allies in the Middle East will not be convinced. The region already has a taste for the way this works after the US’s precipitous withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which lead to the rise of the Islamic State terrorist group. Biden will try not to be so precipitous but the writing is on the wall: the US will reduce its focus and commitment. A scramble for power in the region will begin the moment the ink dries on Biden’s signature of the JCPA. Israel and the Arab states are forming a de facto alliance – based on last year’s Abraham Accords – to prepare for Iran’s push to dominate the region. Even if Iran is not overly aggressive (a big if), Israel and the Gulf Arabs will overreact as a result of their fear of abandonment. They will also seek to hedge their bets by improving ties with the Chinese and Russians, making the Middle East the scene of a major new proxy battle in the global great power struggle. As a risk to our view: if the Biden administration changes course this summer and refuses to lift sanctions or rejoin the Iran deal – low but not zero probability – then tensions with Iran will explode almost instantaneously. The Iranians will threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz and a crisis will erupt in the third or fourth quarter. Bottom Line: The US will most likely rejoin the Iranian nuclear deal by August to avoid an immediate crisis or war. The Biden administration will wager that it can lend enough support to regional allies to keep Iran contained. This might work, as the Iranians will focus on fortifying the regime ahead of its leadership succession. However, Iran’s hardline leadership will see an opportunity in America’s withdrawal from its “forever wars.” Iran will increasingly cooperate with Russia and China. Iran’s conflict with Israel and Saudi Arabia will be extremely difficult to manage and will escalate over time, quite possibly creating a revolution or war in Iraq. The Gulf Arabs are already under immense pressure from the green energy revolution. Thus while oil prices might temporarily fall on the return of Iranian exports, they will later see upward pressure from a new wave of Middle Eastern instability. European Political Risk Has (Probably) Bottomed By contrast with all the above we have viewed Europe as a negligible source of (geo)political risk in 2021. European policy uncertainty is falling in Europe relative to these other powers and the rest of the world (Chart 11). Chart 11Europe's Relative Policy Uncertainty Bottoming Chart 12EU Break-Up Risk Hits Floor (Again) The risk of a break-up of the European Union has wilted and remains at historic lows (Chart 12). There is no immediate threat of any European countries emulating the UK and attempting to exit. Even Italian support for the euro has surged. Immigration flows have plummeted. European solidarity is not on the ballot in the upcoming German and French elections. Germany is choosing between the status quo and a “green revolution” that would not really be a revolution due to the constraints of coalition politics. The Greens have lost some momentum relative to their polling earlier this year but underlying trends suggest they will surprise to the upside in the September 26 vote (Charts 13A and 13B). They embrace EU solidarity, robust government spending, weariness with the Merkel regime, and concerns about climate change, Russia, China, and social justice. Chart 13AGerman Greens Will Surprise To Upside Chart 13BGerman Greens Will Surprise To Upside We expect the Greens to surprise to the upside. But as they are forced into a coalition with the ruling Christian Democrats then they will be limited to raising spending rather raising taxes (Table 2). The market will cheer this result. Table 2German Greens’ Ambitious Tax Hike Proposals If the Greens disappoint then a right-leaning government and too early fiscal tightening could become a risk – but it is a minor risk because Merkel’s hand-picked successor, the CDU Chancellor Candidate Armin Laschet, will be pro-Europe and fiscally dovish, just like the mainstream of his party under Merkel. The only limitation on this dovishness is that it would take another global shock for there to be enough votes in the Bundestag to loosen the schuldenbremse or “debt brake.” In France, President Emmanuel Macron is likely to win re-election – the populist candidate Marine Le Pen remains an underdog who is unlikely to make it through France’s two-round electoral system. In Italy, Prime Minister Mario Draghi is overseeing a national unity coalition that will dole out EU recovery funds. An election cannot be held ahead of the presidential election in January, which will be secured by the establishment parties as a major check on any future populist ruling coalition. The risk in these countries, as in Spain and elsewhere, is that neoliberal structural reform and competitiveness are falling by the wayside. Fiscal largesse is positive for securing the recovery but long-term growth potential will remain depressed (Chart 14). Chart 14European And Global Fiscal Stimulus (Updated June 2021) Europe remains stuck in a liquidity trap over the long run. It depends on the rest of the world for growth. This is a problem given that China’s potential growth is slowing and there is no ready substitute that will prop up global growth. Europe is increasingly ripe for negative “black swan” events. The power vacuum in the Middle East described above will lead to instability and regime failures that will threaten European security. Russia will remain aggressive, a reflection of its crumbling structural foundations. The Putin administration has not changed its strategy of building a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and pushing back against the West, as signaled by the threat to bomb ships that sail in Crimean waters – a unilateral expansion of Russia’s territorial waters following the Crimean invasion. The Biden administration is not seeking anything comparable to the diplomatic “reset” with Russia from 2009-11, which ended in acrimony. In other words, European political risk may be bottoming as we speak. Investment Takeaways Chart 15Limited Equity Upside From Likely US Infrastructure Bill US Peak Fiscal Stimulus: The Biden administration is highly likely to pass an infrastructure package through Congress, either as a bipartisan deal with Republicans or as part of the American Jobs Plan. The result is another $1-$1.5 trillion fiscal stimulus, albeit over an eight-year period, with infrastructure funding taking until 2024-25 to ramp up. Biden’s other plans probably will not pass before the 2022 midterm election, which will likely bring gridlock. Investors are well aware of these proposals and the policy setting will probably be frozen after this year. Hence there is limited remaining upside for global materials sector and US infrastructure plays (Chart 15). The extravagant US fiscal thrust of 2020-21 will turn into a huge fiscal drag in 2022 (Chart 16). The Federal Reserve, however, will remain ultra-dovish as long as labor market slack persists – regardless of who is at the helm. Chart 16US Fiscal Drag Very Large In 2022 Chart 17Go Long Large Caps And Defensives China’s Headwinds Persist: China may or may not ease policy in time to prevent a market riot. China plays and industrial metals are highly exposed to a correction and we recommend steering clear. US-Iran Deal Weighs On Oil Price: Tactically we are neutral on oil and oil plays. An Iran deal could depress oil prices temporarily – and potentially in a major way if the Saudis agree with the Russians on increasing production. Fundamentals are positive but depend on the OPEC 2.0 cartel. The cartel faces the risk that higher prices will incentivize both alternative oil providers and the green revolution. Europe’s Opportunity: We continue to see the euro and European stocks offering value. Given the troubles with Russia we favor developed Europe plays over emerging Europe. The German election would be a bullish catalyst for European assets but headwinds from China will prevail, which is negative for cyclical European stocks. The Russian Duma election, also in September, creates high potential for Russia to clash with the West between now and then. Tactically, go long global large caps and defensives (Chart 17).   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Independent Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders recently felt it was necessary to warn against a second cold war. Sanders, a democratic socialist, is a reliable indicator of the left wing of the Democratic Party and a dissenter who puts pressure on the center-left Biden administration. His fears underscore the dominance of the new hawkish consensus. Appendix China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia